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Abstract 
With an increasing awareness of newly detected but unregulated pollutants in waterbodies, the 
question arises as to how these emerging issues concerning water quality should be politically 
addressed. Environmental economists have advocated market-based instruments because of 
their effectiveness, cost-efficiency, and flexibility. However, lessons from past experiences 
where market forces were used to solve public problems indicate that issues related to 
administrative complexities, legitimacy, or uncertainty can arise. Turning the academic debate 
into an empirical one, this chapter takes an actor perspective and assesses the potential for 
introducing market-based instruments through the example of Switzerland, a forerunner in 
developing water policy to control emerging pollutants. Findings show that Swiss policy 
actors have a preference for command-and-control or voluntary instruments ahead of market-
based approaches for reducing emerging pollutants in water. 
 
 
1. Emerging pollutants - new challenges in water protection policy 
Increasing attention has been placed on “emerging pollutants,” i.e. synthetic organic 
chemicals that have only recently been discovered and deemed a concern in waterbodies. 
Their detection is possible today thanks to improvements in analytical measurement 
technology (Schwarzenbach et al. 2006). Emerging water pollutants include residues of 
personal care products, household detergents, cleaning agents, pharmaceuticals used in aging 
western societies, the fuel additive MBTE, biocides, and metabolites of plant protection 
products (Hollender, Singer, and McArdell 2008). Some of these products contain substances 
that have been in use for decades, while others have been introduced to commerce more 
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recently.  Nevertheless, in both scenarios, the fact that the risks are often unknown generates 
increased concern. Contaminants of emerging concern (CECs) lack a regulatory standard to 
date but may potentially display harmful effects in aquatic life, including toxicity, 
bioaccumulation, and persistency (USEPA 2008). For example, estrogens which are used in 
contraceptive pills and constantly emitted to waterbodies due to incomplete elimination in 
wastewater treatment, have been shown to cause the feminization of fish (Sedlak, Gray, and 
Pinkston 2000). In general, there is growing evidence about the negative impacts of CECs on 
aquatic ecosystems (Brodin et al. 2013, Kidd et al. 2007, Mostafa and Helling 2002) and 
human health (Bercu et al. 2008, Cunningham, Binks, and Olson 2009, Johnson et al. 2008, 
Rowney, Johnson, and Williams 2009, Touraud et al. 2011). However, due to the large 
quantity and diversity of substances currently in use, ecotoxic evidence is still lacking for 
many substances present in water today. Due to the continuous development of new 
compounds and the potential interaction effects between substances and their metabolites, the 
assessment of associated risks presents a challenge today and will continue to be in the future. 
Thus policy makers are left with a decision as to whether to take action regarding emerging 
substances and if so, which policy instrument mix should be used.  
Water quality issues have been addressed in the past by means of two main policy 
approaches: wastewater treatment and environmental quality norms. These traditional policy 
responses have come under considerable stress as conventional wastewater treatment has been 
unable to eliminate numerous emerging pollutants and therefore such pollutants have been 
steadily transported into the aquatic environment (Wittmer et al. 2010). New wastewater 
treatment technologies for emerging pollutants including ozonation, membrane filtering, or 
activated carbon, are in the early phases of development.  Questions regarding toxicity levels 
of transformation products, costs, or energy efficiency have yet to be resolved (Altmann et al. 
2012). An environmental quality norms approach regulates compound by compound.  Here, 
toxicology tests and comprehensive fact sheets are needed for every single substance in order 
3 
to justify its inclusion in a regulation. A compound-by-compound approach is a particularly 
resource-intensive and continuously ongoing task that must take into consideration the 
constant engineering of new substances. 
While existing approaches to water protection must be rethought, developing an 
alternative political answer for the issue of emerging water pollutants is complex. Each 
compound is associated with a unique combination of factors determining its usage, entry-
pathway into waterbodies, behavior in the environment, and effects on the ecosystem or on 
human health. Managing the possible impact of CECs becomes even more intricate. The 
transboundary effects of certain compounds and the local effects of others reflect the multi-
level governance aspect of the issue. Further complexity comes with the involvement of 
various policy fields, such as environmental protection, chemical and agricultural policy, 
consumer, health, and workplace safety. Together, these fields need to bring about effective 
solutions. As CECs represent a complex policy problem, there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
solution. The search for solutions is not a purely technical endeavor. It is also clearly political. 
However, the complexities of CECs really challenge the political realm to design appropriate 
policies that effectively reduce emissions with reasonable costs and administrative efforts. 
Ongoing innovation ensures that it is highly likely that there will always be “new” emerging 
concerns on the agenda of water protection policy. To design policies, it is therefore crucial to 
understand how actors participating in political decision-making generally address new issues, 
i.e. what types of policy approaches do they consider appropriate when dealing with emerging 
problems. As a means of highlighting the potential for policy action in the field of emerging 
water quality issues, the present work explores policy actors’ preferences for different types 
of policy instruments, including combinations of market-based, command-and-control, and 
information-based approaches. The main research question is: Which policy tools do political 
actors prefer when dealing with emerging issues in water quality policy?  
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Environmental economists have propagated the use of market-based instruments (MBI) 
as particularly effective and cost-efficient in reducing pollution since the 1960s (Downing and 
White 1986, Stavins and Hahn 1991, Stavins 1989, Stavins 2004, Coase 1960). There has 
been considerable interest on behalf of the scientific and political community in market 
incentives due to the potential effectiveness, cost-efficiency, flexibility, and legitimacy of the 
polluters-pays-principle. Nevertheless, the adoption of MBI remains limited in scope (Sager 
2009, Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2013) and several challenges with the design of effective MBI 
in water quality policy persist. For example, the non-uniform mixing of water pollution 
requires the establishment of differentiated charges or trading ratios, which are difficult to 
establish (Olmstead 2010). Another design challenge concerns the high transaction costs 
which stifle the cost-efficiency asset of the market-based approach. MBI are not only difficult 
to design but may also appear less appealing to policymakers aiming for pollution reduction. 
In response to the introduction of MBI, for example, targets (such as industry or agriculture) 
may prefer to pay rather than to abate pollution. Consequently, success of pollution control by 
MBI is often uncertain, and thus, less appealing to policymakers. Another reason that renders 
the introduction of MBI less attractive is the illegitimacy of “a right to pollute”. As a 
consequence, the political acceptance of these policy tools has been lagging behind its 
promises (Cordes 2002). Nevertheless, market-based instruments may be an innovative 
method to handling new concerns in water quality policy. The use of substances that serve our 
societies (e.g. medicinal products) can have unintended negative consequences for ecological 
and human health. These necessitate a search for suitable political solutions. The present 
study explores the potential for introducing MBI in this cutting edge policy field and poses the 
question: Do policy actors opt for market-based instruments when addressing the issue of 
contaminant of emerging concern in water, and if so, what type of actors support market-
based approaches?  
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Policy instruments are typically bundled into policy programs which consist of several 
instruments. As a means of capturing preference profiles, i.e. an instrument mix supported by 
actors, the present contribution also addresses the question: Which preference profiles do 
policy actors adopt and do they exhibit similarities in their preference profiles? 
To answer these questions, the present work begins by providing an overview of the 
various types of policy strategies and instruments available to governments for the alleviation 
of pollution in waterbodies. The contribution differentiates between three approaches to water 
protection policy: source-directed, end-of-pipe, and control. Each of these approaches can be 
achieved through various types of command-and-control, market-based, and information-
based instruments.  The next section proposes a definition for policy preference and exposes 
the methodology (case selection, data gathering, methods of analysis). The results section is 
subdivided into three parts in order to answer each of the three research questions. First, 
empirical findings regarding instrument preferences in general, and actors’ support for MBI in 
particular, are displayed. Secondly, preferences by actor types and, thirdly, clusters of actors 
with similar preference profiles are analyzed. The conclusion elaborates on the potential for 
policy action, more specifically for the introduction of MBI, in the emerging field of water 
quality policy. 
2. Policy approaches and instruments for emerging water issues 
In order to secure or improve water quality, governments utilize the many policy instruments 
at their disposal. These can be categorized under three general approaches: source-directed, 
end-of-pipe, and control (Metz and Ingold 2014). While source-directed strategies aim to 
mitigate pollution at the source, end-of-pipe approaches eliminate pollution from wastewater. 
Control strategies do not prioritize pollution reduction, but rather seek to control the level of 
pollution for further policy action. Each of these three strategies can be achieved by means of 
various types of policy instruments, which include regulatory (also termed command-and-
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control), economic (also termed MBI), and voluntary tools (Vedung 1998). Voluntary 
instruments seek to encourage desired behavior, for example by providing target groups with 
information or by negotiating agreements (Doris 2007, Weiss and Tschirhart 1994). By 
contrast, command-and-control instruments directly regulate or impose a certain behavior 
(Lemaire 1998). MBI are policy tools which indirectly stimulate a desired behavior of target 
groups through financial incentives (Stavins and Hahn 1991, Olmstead 2010, Rogers, de 
Silva, and Bhatia 2002). In environmental policy, MBI incentivize environmentally-friendly 
behavior on behalf of society or the economy by placing a price on pollution (Oates and 
Portney 2003). MBI can provide “positive” incentives, i.e. promoting desired behavior 
through reducing the costs of environmentally-friendly practices. Examples of “positive” 
incentives include subsidies for “green” technologies which intend to incentivize desired 
practices. MBI can also set “negative” incentives, i.e. discouraging undesired behavior by 
increasing the costs for activities that pollute the environment. Examples of “negative” 
incentives include pollution charges or tradable permits that set a price on pollution and 
therefore deter citizens from treating the environment as a sink for pollution. 
2.1 Source-directed policy approaches 
Source-directed policy approaches include policy instruments that impose, incentivize, or 
encourage reducing the use of CECs, or implementing emission reduction measures in order 
to prevent their release into water. Table 7.1 provides an overview of the different instruments 
(command-and-control, market-based and information-based) that can be adopted to pursue 
the source-directed approach in water protection policy and explains each instrument’s 
functioning.  
<TABLE 7.1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
As Table 7.1 shows, a number of MBI can be adopted to effectively reduce emerging 
pollutants at the source (Metz and Ingold 2014). First, a substance charge can be levied to 
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incentivize producers or consumers to reduce the use of substances that raise concern when 
emitted into waterbodies. The charge can also be levied on products that contain harmful 
substances. While charges punish environmentally-unfriendly behavior, subsidies set a 
positive incentive by rewarding “green” action. For example, farmers can be subsidized for 
adopting agricultural practices that prevent field losses, e.g. increasing buffer zones, or 
applying fewer plant protection products. Subsidies can also be granted to set an incentive to 
businesses for developing water-friendly products (e.g. “green pharmacy”) or adapting 
production chains to enable a more efficient use of relevant chemicals.  
Although not listed in Table 7.1, emission control may, in theory, also be possible under 
a permit trading system for emerging pollutants. However, many diverse compounds fall 
under the category of emerging pollutants. Additionally, trading ratios between different 
substances which are necessary due to water pollution’s lack of uniform mixing, have not 
been defined to date (Farrow et al. 2005, Hung and Shaw 2005). For example, under the US 
American Rock River Basin Pilot Trading Program in Wisconsin, each unit of point-source 
pollution corresponds to 1.75 units of non-point source pollution (Olmstead 2010). One unit 
of point source pollution abatement corresponds to more than one unit of non-point source 
pollution because there remain considerable uncertainties over the fate of pollution from 
diffuse sources (Olmstead 2010). In general, trading ratios may vary between each pair of 
trading partners. Consequently, the establishment of trading ratios increases the transaction 
costs of water quality trading programs rendering them difficult to design in a cost-efficient 
manner.   
2.2 End-of-pipe policy approaches 
In contrast to source-directed policy approaches, end-of-pipe measures focus on removing or 
eliminating CECs after their use or release into water. End-of-pipe policies involve different 
types of instruments that impose, incentivize, or encourage improved wastewater treatment. 
Conventional municipal wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) have not been designed to 
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remove most of the substances that fall under CECs which are resistant to biological 
degradation. Hence, new wastewater treatment technologies must be implemented that can 
effectively eliminate CECs. One policy option for the reduction of CECs in water is to 
provide incentives for the upgrade of WWTP with new removal technologies. Another end-
of-pipe option involves improvement of waste disposal where products containing CECs have 
been used by consumers, but their release into water is prevented by waste disposal 
requirements.  
 
<TABLE 7.2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 7.2 displays the types of MBI that can be adopted for the reduction of emerging 
pollutants at the end of the pipe. Corrective charges may take the form of emission charges, 
for example, where volumes of treated wastewater are used as a tax base. Under a more 
complex system, the charge could be calculated based on concentrations of harmful 
substances in treated wastewater. Furthermore, subsidies can be allocated to industrial and 
municipal sewage treatment plants in order to incentivize investments in advanced treatment 
technology (Metz and Ingold 2014). 
2.3 Control policy approaches 
Control measures are distinct from source-directed and end-of-pipe approaches in water 
protection in the sense that they do not directly reduce emissions of substances into 
waterbodies. Instead, control measures consist of gathering information on occurrence, fate, 
and risks of CECs in waterbodies in order to lay the ground for future pollution reduction 
measures. Aside from information gathering and data analysis, this approach typically 
involves reporting results to higher levels of government. Such accounts, in turn, synthesize 
information for further decision-making. Control instruments can take the form of mandatory 
or voluntary programs, both of which can be financially supported by governments.  
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<TABLE 7.3 ABOUT HERE> 
2.4 Policy instrument mixes – a task that transcends policy fields 
In the empirical reality, policy instruments are often combined to become instrument mixes. 
These are defined as bundles of several policy instrument types (Howlett 2005, Gunningham 
and Sinclair 1991). Likewise, policy instruments following source-directed, end-of-pipe and 
control approaches are not mutually exclusive but are often bundled in the form of policy 
mixes. For example, sales volumes for a specific substance could be capped on a yearly basis 
for a defined market such as the EU or US to prevent emissions into water. Above the cap, a 
ban could be introduced for marketing the substance and below the cap a substance charge 
could be put in place. The substance charge could be earmarked to subsidize advanced 
treatment technology, where it is necessary to use the substance (e.g. for health purposes). 
Companies that use the substance, but improve their production processes (where inputs into 
waterbodies are avoided) could be exempted from the charge if they can prove that their 
effluents are free of that substance through monitoring and reporting. Subsidies for advice and 
consulting about advanced treatment or improved production processes could also be part of 
the instrument mix. Consulting would support pollution reduction measures, which is 
preferable to a situation where companies pay the charge and continue to emit pollutants.  
The example further illustrates that instrument mixes for the protection of water 
resources typically involve diverse, intersecting policy fields, such as agriculture, industry, 
health, water, and environmental protection. Another example includes information 
campaigns. These could be adopted in the health sector to sensitize people for green pharmacy 
or in the agricultural sector to raise farmers’ awareness of the impact of veterinary 
pharmaceuticals on water quality.  
10 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Case and data gathering 
Water quality represents an example of a public good especially in the case of several 
countries sharing a river. In  an international river setting, upstream polluters have no 
incentive to decrease pollution as long as they bear the complete costs of abatement, but 
benefits of clean waterbodies materialize predominantly downstream (Olmstead 2010). MBI 
have the potential to correct such false incentives by internalizing the costs of pollution 
control and adhering to the polluter pays principle. At the same time however, transboundary 
settings can be particularly unfavorable to the introduction of MBI in cases where states fear 
competitive disadvantages to their national economies. In exploring the prospects for 
introducing MBI into water pollution control, the present study takes the case of control in 
Switzerland, a country which lies upstream from many European rivers. 
Switzerland represents one of the first countries where the issue of emerging pollutants 
has entered the political agenda. Between 2007 and 2015, the political debate centered on how 
to best address emissions from point-sources of pollution, i.e. from municipal WWTPs. Since 
2015, Swiss actors have searched for political answers regarding ways in which to reduce 
emissions from diffuse sources, including agriculture and urban areas.1 From April to July of 
2013, a total of 62 policy actors who were involved in the policymaking process on emerging 
pollutants in Switzerland were surveyed. Policy actors are collective actors which include 
agencies, organizations or associations that represent public and private sector interests. 
Actors were surveyed when they a) participated at least twice in the policy-making process 
(decisional approach), b) held formal regulatory competences in the field of emerging water 
pollutants (positional approach), and c) were considered indispensable by experts in the field 
(reputational approach) (Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1983, Knoke 1994). With a 
                                                 
1 See Website of the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment: 
https://www.bafu.admin.ch/bafu/en/home/topics/water/info-specialists/state-of-waterbodies/state-of-
watercourses/water-quality-in-watercourses/micropollutants-in-watercourses.html (accessed June 27, 2017).  
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response rate of 68%, survey results from 42 actors2 (for a list of actors see annex 1) were 
analyzed. This provides a representative overview of the preferences of all involved sectors 
(federal agencies, cantons, parliament, political parties; environmental, economic, water, 
labor, consumer and municipal associations).  
3.2 Definition of policy instrument preferences and data 
The aim of the present research is to explore actors’ preferences towards a variety of policy 
instrument types from a policy science perspective. The following three aspects help to 
delimit the concept of preferences as employed here.   
First, in order to grasp the concept of instrument preferences, it is useful to distinguish 
between attitudes and actual behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). Research on political 
behavior has indicated that individuals’ behavior may deviate from their reported attitudes 
and hence, introduced the notion of “value-action gap”. The term “preference” refers to 
attitudes and not to behavior. Instrument preferences express actors’ positive attitudes, i.e. 
inclination or desire to introduce certain types of policy tools in order to address an 
underlying policy problem. However, actors’ behavior of actively opting or voting for one 
policy option in the policy-making process may deviate from underlying attitudes and is not 
considered in this study.  
Secondly, one can conceptualize “preferences” as attitudes adopted in a specific stage of 
the policymaking process, i.e. in policy formulation rather than in the phase of adoption or 
implementation (Dermont et al. 2016). During policy formulation, where actors review and 
debate diverse policy alternatives, their policy preferences come into play in the form of 
attitudes (i.e. positive or negative inclinations). By contrast, the terms “support” or 
“opposition”, as employed here, refer to the voting in parliament for (or against) an actual 
policy decision in the phase of policy adoption; and the term “acceptance” to the change of 
behavior during the policy implementation stage. The term “preference” is thus restricted to 
                                                 
2 Depending on the survey question, between 35 and 42 actors gave their responses.  
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attitudes of actors towards policy instruments in the policy formulation phase. Based on this 
definition, policy preferences can be considered a type of “opinion poll” against which the 
chances of introducing a policy in later stages of the policy process can be evaluated. 
Likewise, the present study looks at policy formulation where diverse types of state and non-
state actors debate over policy options in order to assess the prospects for MBI in water 
quality policy. Policy actors are defined here as collective entities who adopt policy 
preferences and the desire to transform their preferences into public policy through their 
participation in the policy-making process (Knill and Tosun 2012, p. 41). Examples of policy 
actors include parliamentary commissions, governmental or bureaucratic bodies from local, 
regional, and national levels, political parties, and target or interest groups. 
Finally, it is useful to distinguish different hierarchical levels of policy attitudes in order 
to define the notion of instrument preferences. The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
establishes a multi-tiered hierarchical concept of attitudes by broadly distinguishing stable 
deep core and policy core beliefs from less stable secondary aspects (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993). While secondary aspects refer to preferences for various types of policy 
instruments, beliefs in general reflect the deeply rooted values underlying instrument 
preferences. For example, actors may value market liberties and competition very highly. 
Based on these market liberal values, they may favor MBI over coercive command-and-
control instruments. The present research focuses on the lowest, most concrete hierarchical 
level of policy attitudes by studying which instruments actors prefer in order to address a 
policy problem such as reducing pollution in waterbodies. 
In the above-mentioned survey, respondents were asked to report their policy 
preferences (from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”) towards a series of policy 
instruments for the reduction of emerging pollutants in waterbodies. Table 7.4 provides an 
overview of the 15 different regulatory, economic, and voluntary policy tools that were 
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surveyed. The preference data was analyzed by means of descriptive statistics, including a 
correspondence and a cluster analysis. 
 
<TABLE 7.4 ABOUT HERE> 
4. Results  
4.1 Preferences by type of policy instrument 
In the next paragraph, policy actors’ instrument preferences towards MBI are assessed in 
comparison with other policy tools, including various command-and-control and information-
based instruments. 
 
<TABLE 7.5 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Results in Table 7.5 show that among the 42 actors who responded to the survey 
questions, 53.5% support MBI for reducing emerging contaminants. More concretely, 24.3% 
of the actors reported to agree somewhat with the introduction of MBI and 29.2% strongly 
agreed. By contrast, 46.5% of the respondents reported that they either disagree somewhat 
(29.6%) or strongly disagree (16.9%) with reducing emerging pollutants by means of MBI. 
Although they demonstrate some support for MBI, policy actors remain divided on the 
aptitude of MBI to reduce water quality issues. Figure 7.1 depicts instrument preferences in 
greater detail, with 75% of actors supporting an increase in wastewater fees to fund measures 
for reducing emerging pollutants in sewage treatment plants. Filtering pollution from 
wastewater constitutes a policy preference even if costs for sewage treatment increase. These 
results indicate that technical solutions to address water quality problems at the end of the 
pipe are largely accepted, even if (or because) this means that polluters do not have to change 
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behaviors to abate pollution at the source. In contrast, only 25% of actors reject a fee that 
funds the technical upgrade of wastewater treatment filters.  
By contrast, source-directed MBI such as product charges receive less support. A 
product charge is a policy tool that addresses the problem at the source. Commodities that 
contain harmful substances become more expensive, and hence, the product charge 
incentivizes consumers to buy (or industry to produce) more environmentally-friendly 
alternatives. 57.1% of the respondents rejected (25.7% disagreed altogether; 31.4% disagreed 
somewhat) product charges for the reduction of pollution in waters. Motives included high 
transaction costs associated with the identification and registration of the numerous products 
that contribute to pollution into waterbodies.  Furthermore, the demand for some products, 
e.g. pharmaceuticals, is non-elastic, and therefore a charge would not incentivize consumers 
to reduce consumption.  In addition, Figure 7.1 shows that 57.5% of the policy actors reject 
“positive” economic incentives in the form of subsidies for environmentally-friendly 
behavior, while only 42.5% of actors support it.  
 
<FIGURE 7.1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
In summary, results indicate that Swiss actors reject MBI in the form of product charges 
or subsidies to reduce CECs at the source whereas they support the increase of wastewater 
fees to address CECs at the end-of-pipe. Disputes remain concerning MBI, especially when 
comparing the results for MBI with those for command-and-control or information-based 
instruments. On average, 84.5% of actors support the introduction of traditional command-
and-control instruments in matters of emerging concern for water quality. Examples of 
regulatory instruments include bans of certain contaminants or environmental quality norms 
that set concentration limits for selected substances in waterbodies. In Figure 7.1, one can see 
that, with 95% agreement, actors’ support is highest with regard to best-environmental-
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practices (BEP). BEPs are typically employed to control pollution from agriculture. Among 
others, BEPs define the correct application of pesticides in order to reduce run-off from 
agricultural fields. Policy actors also supported information-based instruments, e.g. voluntary 
measures on behalf of polluters, or information campaigns sensitizing people to adopt an 
environmentally-friendly behavior. It is noteworthy however, that almost all respondents 
(97.5%) considered further research essential for better understanding the risks of emerging 
pollutants, their sources, and their entry paths into the environment.   
When comparing the results for actors’ consent towards MBI (53.5%) with actors’ 
support for regulatory (84.5%) and information-based instruments (86.1%) it becomes evident 
that more skepticism exists towards MBI than towards other policy alternatives. Actors’ 
instrument preferences show that command-and-control and information-based instruments 
are still deemed appropriate for water pollution control, whereas the support for MBI lags 
behind. As a consequence, the introduction of MBI is less likely to transpire than is the 
adoption of traditional or soft policy tools for the reduction of emerging pollutants in 
waterbodies.  
In a next step, actors’ instrument preferences are examined in greater detail by 
analyzing individual actors’ preferences for instrument mixes. To do so, the correspondence 
analysis3 shown in Figure 7.2 illustrates where actors (represented by dark blue dots) diverge 
most. More specifically, Figure 7.2 indicates on which policy instruments (represented by red 
arrows), or mixes thereof, actors diverge most. It also shows the primary preferences of each 
single actor.  
The red arrows for product charges (pcharge) and voluntary instruments (volunt) point 
in opposite directions. This illustrates how those policy instruments explain most of the 
                                                 
3 The correspondence analysis in form of a biplot shows two dimensions, which explain most of the 
variance of actors’ instrument preferences. In technical terms, the goal of the correspondence analysis is to look 
for systematic, internal variance in the data, without considering exogenous variables for the explanation of 
preferences. The two dimensions of the correspondence analysis together only explain about 43% of the internal 
variance, which means that actors’ instrument preferences exhibit only a medium-level of systematic variance. 
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variation in the data. If actors diverge, they tend to favor one over the other and rarely favor 
both simultaneously. Subsidies for the upgrade of wastewater treatment technology (subsi) 
and authorization restrictions (authrestr) are orthogonally distributed to preferences for 
charges and voluntary instruments. Again, if actors diverge, they tend to either be in favor of 
technological upgrades or authorization restrictions, but rarely of both simultaneously. The 
four different dimensions effectively reflect varying approaches to water protection with a) 
market-based approaches (represented by pcharge), b) voluntary measures (volunt), c) 
command-and-control (authrest), and d) technical solutions (subsi). Instruments belonging to 
the same family point in the same direction, which means that they capture a similar 
dimension of actors’ instrument preferences. For example, the instruments belonging to the 
family of voluntary instruments, such as research, private public partnerships (ppp), or 
information campaigns (info), all point in the same direction. Likewise, there is a cluster of 
MBI represented by product charges and wastewater fees. Of note is that Swiss actors 
strongly associate subsidies with technical end-of-pipe measures because other technology-
promoting instruments such as subsidies for investments in advanced sewage treatment 
technology and best available techniques (bat), point in the same direction. Most of the 
variance in the cluster of command-and-control instruments is explained by authorization 
restrictions (authrest). Nevertheless, preferences for instruments from the same family of 
command-and-control instruments such as environmental quality norms (eqn), use restrictions 
(userestr), disposal requirements (disposal), or emission limits (el), point in the same direction 
and therefore capture a similar aspect of actors’ preferences. All in all, results for other 
instruments also reflect the four clusters and further confirm that actors are most divided upon 
market-based, voluntary, command-and-control, and technical approaches to water protection. 
Actors’ location in Figure 7.2 further illustrates their preferences in the form of 
instrument mixes. For example, the Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP) is positioned 
towards information-based instruments including research, information campaigns, and 
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voluntary measures. Pro Natura, an environmental protection organization, exhibits a 
contrasting preference profile by pointing towards economic measures including product 
charges and wastewater fees. It is noteworthy that associations representing the interests of 
cantons (e.g. KVU), large cities (ERFA), and municipalities  (KI/SSV/SGV), who are 
responsible for the implementation of sewage treatment, support technical approaches for the 
improvement of wastewater technologies (bat, subsi). Finally, it is worth highlighting that 
actors located closest to the center in Figure 7.2 have the most equilibrated preference 
profiles. The Department for Water within the Federal Office for the Environment (BAFU-
W/UVEK) who led this policy process, can be located at the center of the biplot. This reflects 
the actor’s position as a neutral coordinator of the policy process.  
 
<FIGURE 7.2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
4.3 Preferences by type of actor 
Figure 7 . 3 shows rejection and support levels of policy instruments by actor type in order 
to address the question of whether certain actor types prefer MBI over others. Black to dark 
grey squares illustrate rejection and light grey to white illustrate support. Industrial and 
agricultural actors strongly refuse economic instruments including product charges, 
wastewater fees and subsidies. Actors representing the interests of the economy do not 
necessarily favor MBI, even if these instruments are said to be economically efficient for 
society according to economic theory (Stavins 1989, Andersen and Sprenger 2000). These 
results indicate that a policy instrument’s ability to target individual actors and affect their 
budget is what matters to them; in other words, whether an actor is on the winning or losing 
side of the policy. In contrast, the cost-efficiency of a policy matters less to the individual 
actor because cost-efficiency concerns society in general and not necessarily the individual 
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actor. Here, actors seem to associate MBI (sproduct charges or subsidies) with (transaction) 
costs for themselves rather than with cost-efficiency.   
 Industrial and agricultural actors also reject strong governmental control in t h e  
form of authorization restrictions (authrestr) or monitoring requirements (contr). 
Additionally, federal state actors and political parties approach economic instruments 
consisting of product charges and subsidies with hesitation. In most cases, all the others, i.e. 
scientific, environmental, water, regional, and local actors, acknowledge the need to take 
policy measures for the reduction of emerging pollutants in waterbodies and agree with most 
types of policy intervention that serves the purpose of water protection. Overall, results 
highlight that there is potential for concerted policy action in the underlying case. Half of the 
actor groups are open to varying instrument types as long as water protection is ensured. 
However, important actor groups especially industrial and agricultural associations and to 
some extent state actors and political parties, particularly object to policy intervention in the 
form of MBI.  
 
<FIGURE 7.3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
4.4 Clusters of actors with similar preference profiles  
The cluster dendogram in Figure 7.4 illustrates (dis)similarities in actors’ instrument 
preference profiles. Actors clustered closer together exhibit similar preference profiles. The 
higher one moves up on the dendogram, the more relaxed similarity conditions become. On a 
general level, actors cluster into four groups. When pairing the information about clusters 
with the coloring of actor labels in Figure 7.2 (see above), one obtains a detailed picture of the 
instrument preferences for each cluster. Accordingly, the first  “orange” cluster (when reading 
Figure 7.4 from left to right) consists of the Basel Chamber of Commerce (HKBB), 
Economiesuisse, the Swiss Employers' Association (ECON/SAV), and the Swiss Trade 
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Association (SGV). Also located in this cluster of economic associations is the Swiss People's 
Party. Together they oppose most policy action in the field of emerging issues in water 
protection and only agree with voluntary measures on behalf of society or the economy. The 
second, “green” cluster includes all actors between Ecotox Centre (OEKOTOX) and World 
Wide Fund For Nature Switzerland (WWF). The cluster signifies environmentally-oriented 
actors who favor concrete, binding policy action and therefore support all types of policy 
instruments except for voluntary ones. In the third “yellow” cluster are state and non-state 
actors who do not generally object to policy action, but mostly favor soft policy instruments, 
which either inform about pollution (e.g. through research or information campaigns) or 
control pollution in waterbodies (e.g. through environmental quality norms) but do not yet 
reduce pollution. The fourth, “blue” cluster includes all the actors between the Conference of 
Heads of Cantonal Offices for Environmental Protection (KVU) and the Swiss Water 
Association (VSA). This group represents a mix of actors who generally favor policy action 
for the reduction of emerging pollutants in waterbodies and therefore opt for a diversified 
instrument mix.  
In summary, the orange cluster consists of opponents to policy action or advocates of 
non-binding measures. In contrast, the green cluster defends the necessity of political action 
by means of binding instruments. Illustrated in the yellow cluster are moderate actors who 
favor policies that lay the ground for future action where such action is necessary. Following 
the rationale where some action is still better than no action, the blue cluster is populated by 
actors who generally support policy action via any instrument.   
 
<FIGURE 7.4 ABOUT HERE> 
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5. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the types of policy instruments which actors consider 
appropriate in addressing emerging water problems and to shed light on the potential for 
introducing MBI by analyzing Swiss policy actors’ instrument preferences. Preferences are 
defined by actor type and profiles for mixes of policy instruments are explored.  
Empirical results indicate that there remain barriers for the application of MBI in 
influencing emerging issues in water quality policy. Overall, the surveyed actors remain 
divided on the use of MBI for water pollution control. Policy actors prefer wastewater fees for 
a technical end-of-pipe solution over source-directed measures, such as product charges or 
subsidies for environmentally-friendly practices. Industrial and agricultural actors are 
particularly averse to MBI, indicating that they associate those instruments with rising costs 
(for themselves) rather than with cost-efficient environmental protection (for all). In more 
general terms, the perception of the target group as to whether they will benefit or loose from 
an introduced policy clearly impacts their instrument preferences. The fact that a vast majority 
of survey respondents support command-and-control and information-based instruments to 
control pollution in waterbodies affirms their skepticism towards economic incentives.  
If policy preferences are considered as an “opinion poll” on the basis of which the 
chance of introducing a policy in later stages of the policy process can be evaluated, one may 
conclude that MBI still struggle to become a widely supported trend in water policy. This 
conclusion is confirmed by the 2014 revision of the Swiss Waters Protection Act (31.3.2014) 
for the reduction of CECs from point-sources of pollution in waterbodies. Rather than 
introducing a market-based and source-directed approach, the Swiss policy follows a 
technical end-of-pipe strategy and focuses on the technical upgrade of WWTPs for the 
elimination of CECs from treated wastewater.  
To date, it is individuals (companies, farmers, households) that profit from using the 
environment as a sink, whilst it is society as a whole that bears the costs for pollution 
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abatement. Despite its potential to change such imbalances by making polluters pay for their 
discharges, MBI have thus far not successfully developed into a generally-accepted water 
trend for the reduction of CECs in Switzerland. Present results suggest that emerging issues 
follow the same logic as previously made observations did in revealing the limitations of 
political support for MBI. This is in comparison to the use of traditional command-and-
control instruments within the realm of environmental policy (Cordes 2002, Harring 2015).  
As such, barriers must be broken before MBI can be successfully adopted in environmental 
policy (Cordes 2002). The literature has discussed many reasons why MBI face acceptance 
difficulties, including policy design questions i.e. the detailed provisions specifying to whom, 
for how long and on which level a policy applies (Howlett 2011, Howlett and Rayner 2007). 
Crucial questions in literature remain unanswered concerning the design of well-accepted 
MBI.  
As a consequence, policy makers are responsible for adapting economic theory to the 
political reality and for designing concrete policy instruments. However, this translation 
process may prove difficult as policymaking follows its own rationality (Bressers and 
Huitema 2000). For instance, while environmental economists evaluate policy tools against 
their effectiveness and cost-efficiency, policy makers consider additional criteria such as 
preferences, equity, legitimacy, visibility, or feasibility. Thus, when market-based instruments 
are employed as policy tools, they transgress the institution-free world of the market and enter 
the broader institutional context of politics. As a consequence, the design of economic 
instruments may deviate from the ideal model as described by environmental economics, and 
also prove less effective or cost-efficient (Hahn 1989).  
Hence, not only market rules but also political dimensions should be taken into 
consideration when designing MBI. Further research is needed in order to understand the 
policy design conditions under which policy actors would be most confident when it comes to 
market-based approaches. Furthermore, research on the factors driving instrument preferences 
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from a comparative perspective would aid researchers in this field to better evaluate the 
circumstances under which MBI could eventually become a well-accepted trend in water 
policy.  
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Table 7.1: Source-directed policy instruments of water protection 
Category Instrument Explanation 
Regulatory Substance bans Complete prohibition of a certain compound with the goal 
of a cessation of pollution 
Restrictions/use restrictions Constraints to the placement on the market or the use of a 
substance in specific points in time or zones (e.g. buffer 
zones) 
Authorization Evaluation-dependent authorization of chemicals based on 
their predicted risks to human health and the environment4  
Best environmental practices 
(BEP)  
Mandatory codes of conduct to reduce emissions 
MBI Product charges Tax levied on products containing hazardous compounds 
in order to incentivize consumers to reduce or change 
consumption behaviors 
Substance charges Tax levied on hazardous compounds in order to 
incentivize producers to change production processes or 
substitute chemicals with less hazardous alternatives. 
Subsidies for “green” action 
 
Financial support from governments in return for 
environmental commitments by the private sector 
Voluntary  Information campaigns Transfer of knowledge or persuasive reasoning on how to 
avoid aquatic pollution 
Voluntary agreements between 
private and public sectors 
Non-legally binding agreements negotiated on a case-by-
case basis between single firms and a public authority 
fixing environmental targets or specific mitigation 
measures (e.g. changes in the production chain)5 
  
                                                 
4 Such evaluations can also take into account principles of green chemistry such as "rational design" or "benign 
by design”, i.e. easy and fast degradability of chemicals after their use. Considering the full life cycle of 
chemicals will lead to a different understanding of the functionality and environmental properties of chemicals 
and incentivize the manufacturing of degradable chemicals. 
5 These private-public agreements can also be legally binding. In such cases, agreements do not classify as 
voluntary instruments. 
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Table 7.2: End-of-pipe policy instruments of water protection 
Category Instrument Explanation 
Regulatory Best available technique (BAT) Definition of the best technology for improved wastewater 
treatment 
Technical standards Definition of performance standards for wastewater 
treatment (e.g. treatment capacity) without requiring a 
specific technology  
 Disposal requirements Standards of correct waste disposal, e.g. consumer-level 
„take-back“ programs for pharmaceuticals 
MBI Effluent/emission charges Tax on using water bodies as a sink for discharges in order 
to incentivize emission reduction 
Subsidies for improved 
wastewater treatment 
Financial support from governments to incentivize operators 
to invest in advanced wastewater treatment; or to promote 
research on improved wastewater treatment 
Voluntary  Advice Support from governments in form of information, advice, 
and consultancy about improved wastewater treatment  
Voluntary agreements on 
wastewater treatment 
Non-legally binding agreements negotiated on a case-by-
case basis between wastewater treatment operators and a 
public authority to improve wastewater treatment 
practices 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.3: Control instruments of water protection 
Category Instrument Explanation 
Regulatory Imission limits / environmental 
quality norms (EQN) 
Definition of a mandatory cap to concentration levels of 
defined substances in water bodies 
Emission limit Definition of a mandatory cap to concentration levels of 
defined substances in effluents of defined sources 
Registries Cadaster registering defined information, such as the sales 
or the marketing volumes of a substance, or the releases of 
chemicals from point sources (e.g. Pollutant Release and 
Transfer Registers) 
Monitoring Mandatory gathering of information about the occurrence 
of substances in water bodies 
Reporting Mandatory compilation and analysis of defined 
information on the state of the aquatic environment 
MBI Subsidies for monitoring Financial support from governments for monitoring 
activities 
Voluntary  Voluntary agreements on control 
measures 
Non-legally binding agreements negotiated on a case-by-
case basis between polluters and public authorities on 
voluntary EQNs or monitoring activities 
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Table 7.4: Overview about surveyed instrument preferences 
 Variable Description of instrument 
Regulatory  authrestr Authorization 
userestr Restrictions/use restrictions 
disposal Disposal requirements  
bat Best available technique (BAT) 
bep Best environmental practice (BEP)  
eqn Immission limit/environmental quality norm (EQN) 
el Emission limit 
control Reporting, monitoring, registries 
MBI pcharge Product charge 
wwfee Effluent/emission charge 
subsi Subsidies for improved wastewater treatment 
Voluntary volunt Voluntary agreements 
info Information campaigns, advice 
research Research 
ppp Voluntary agreements between private and public sectors called 
private-public partnerships or public-public partnerships (PPP) 
Note: See boxes in chapter 2 for an explanation of each single instrument 
 
 
 
Table 7.5: Mean preferences for grouped instruments 
Instruments Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Agree 
somewhat 
Strongly 
agree 
Mean regulatory instruments 4.4%  13.2% 39.3% 45.2% 
Mean MBI 16.9% 29.6% 24.3% 29.2% 
Mean voluntary instruments 3.4% 11.4% 43.8% 42.3% 
N=42 
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